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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and .Respondent, v. RAYMOND 
FORREST TRELOAR, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibllity.-
Defendant's confessions made in response to intensive question-
ing at the police 3tation after his arrest and without first being-
advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent should 
have been excluded. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Admissibllity.-Confessions are 
not admissible where it appears that they were obtained by an 
investigation no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime but one focused on a particular suspect in custody, that 
authorities carried out a process of interrogation lending itself 
to eliciting incriminating statements, that the authorities had 
not effectively informed defendant of his right to counselor of 
his absolute right to remain silent, and that no evidence estab-
lishes waiver of these rights. 
[S] Id.-Judgment-Collateral Attack.-There was not such a de-
liberate bypassing of orderly state procedures to justify denial 
of collateral relief in the federal courts where defendant did 
not have a realistic opportunity to invoke the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision clarifying his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent during a criminal investigation in the approximately 
three weeks between the decision and the time the judgment as 
to his guilt became final, and the practice of the state Supreme 
Court on collateral attack compelled the granting of relief from 
the judgment tainted by the use of defendant's confession ob-
tained in violation of such rights. 
[4] Id.-Appeal- Reversible Error - Evidence - Confessions.-
Where the introduction of defendant's confession in violation 
of his rights to counsel and to remain silent compels reversal 
of the judgment on the issue of guilt on all counts, the judg-
ment on the issue of penalty must necessarily be reversed. 
[5a-5c] Id. - Evidence - AdmiSSions to Prosecuting Officers. ---
Defendant's exclamations as the arresting omcer reached to 
disarm him, "You have the right man" and "This is the gun I 
had" were entirely spontaneous and admissible though defend-
ant had not been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 422; Am.Jur., Evidence (lst ed 
§ 478). 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Criminal Law, § 464; [3] Criminal 
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[6a.-6c] ld. - Evidence - Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-
Where, after defendant's arrest, he volunteered to an officer in 
the police car thnt he wonld not have been mmght had the po-
lice been a few minutes later in arresting him-that he had 
planned to leave for South America-nnd then asked how long 
a certain murder victim had lived, his statement and question 
were spontaneous and admissible though he had not been ad-
vised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. 
[7a.-7c] ld. - Evidence - Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-
Where, after defendant's arrest, an officer in the police car 
answerpd defendant's question as to how long a certain murder 
victim had lived and asked defendant what happened to 
another victim, defendant's response that the victim tried to be 
a hero was volunteered in answer to a neutral inquiry invited 
by his own remarks as was his explanation, on request, that 
the victim would not do what he was told. Such police conduct 
was not intimidating, aceusatory, or designed to elicit incrimi-
nating statements, and defendant's response and explanation 
were admissible though he had not been advised. of his rights 
to counselor to remain silent. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Mark Brandler, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for first degree robbery, kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery without bodily harm. and murder. Judgment 
of conviction imposing death penalty, after retrial of the 
murder penalty issue only, reversed in its entirety solely on the 
grounds announced in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal. 
Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]. 
Ollie M. Marie-Victoire, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon Ringer, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant was convicted on 13 counts 
of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a), two counts 
of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery without bodily harm 
(Pen. Code, § 209), and one count of murder committed dur-
ing one of the robberies (Pen. Code, § 189). The jury fixed 
the punishment at death on the murder count. The court 
sentenced defendant to prison for the term prescribed by law 
on the robbery and kidnaping counts and to death on the 
) 
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murder count. On a prior appeal, we affirmed the judgment 
on the issue of guilt but reversed .on the issue of penalty. 
(People v. Treloar, 61 Cal.2d 544, 550 [39 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 
P.2d 698].) On retrial the jury again fixed the penalty at 
death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. 
(b).) 
The facts with respect to the commission of the crimes 
were summarized in our former opinion and need not be re-
peated. (People v. Treloar, supra, 61 Ca1.2d at pp. 545-546.) 
[la] After he was arrested and taken to the police sta-
tion, defendant was questioned intensively. Two complete 
confessions, in which he gave full details concerning the rob-
beries and the murder, were solicited by the police and were 
introduced into evidence against him at the trial on the issue 
of guilt and at the subsequent penalty trials. 
[2] Confessions are not admissible if they were obtained 
when" (1) the investigation was no longer a general inquiry 
into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particu-
lar suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody, (3) the authori-
ties had carried out a process of interrogations that lent 
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, (4) the authori-
ties had not effectively informed defendant of his right to 
counselor of his absolute right to remain silent, and no evi-
dence establishes that he waived these rights." (People v. 
Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 353-354 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361] ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 
L.Ed.2d 977].) [lb] It is conceded that at no time was 
defendant advised of these rights before he gave the confes-
sions. The confessions should therefore have been excluded. 
In In re Spencer, 63 Oal.2d 400 [46 Oal.Rptr. 753, 406 
P.2d 33], and People v. Polk, 63 Ca1.2d 443 [47 Oal.Rptr. 1, 
406 P.2d 641], we held that by virtue of Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 [85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601], 
footnote 5, a defendant may invoke Escobedo to attack a final 
judgment on the issue of guilt in a subsequent proceeding 
relatmg to penalty, if the judgment on the issue of guilt was 
not final when Escobedo was decided and if the defendant 
had no opportunity to raise the constitutional issue at trial 
and on appeal. [3] The judgment against defendant on 
the issue of guilt did not become final until 30 days after it 
was affirmed by this court on July 14, 1964, approximately 
three weeks after Escobedo was decided. Under the law ap-
plicable at the time the appeal was briefed and argued, no 
question could have been raised on Escobedo grounds. Defen-
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dant did not waive his Escobedo claims by failure of counsel 
to call the attention of this court to the significance of that 
case by supplemental brief or petition· for rehearing in the 
few weeks between the decision in Escobedo and the time our 
jUdgment beca~e final. Under the circumstances, defendant 
did not have a realistic opportunity to invoke the Escobedo 
case in his earlier appeal. There was not, therefore, such a 
deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures as would 
justify a denial of collateral relief in the federal courts (see 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 439 [83 S.Ot. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 
837] ), and here, as in the Polk and Spencer cases, our prac-
tice on collateral attack compels the granting of relief. 
[4] Since the violation of Escobedo compels reversal of 
the judgment on the issue of guilt on all counts, 1 the judg- ' 
ment on the issue of penalty must necessarily be reversed. 2 
Other questions remain that may arise on retrial. 
IThe Attorney General contends that because defendant erose-examined 
only sixteen of the thirty-six prosecution witnesses and erose-examined 
those sixteen only briefly, because he did not testify and did not call 
any witnesses on his behalf, and because he waived argument to the jury, 
his conduct at the trial on the issue of guilt amounted to a "slow plea 
of guilty," making applicable our decision in In re Seiterle, 61 Cal.2d 
651 [39 Cal.Rptr. 716, 394 P.2d 556]. In that case we said that "we 
need not consider whether the confession was improperly obtained under 
the rules announced in recent decisions .... Assuming that Seiterle's 
confession was obtained in violation of those rules, it was not used to 
convict him; his conviction was based on his plea of guilty." (Id. at 
p. 657.) The Attorney General cites no authority for his novel contention, 
and we find no merit in it. A plea of guilty is "the equivalent of a 
conviction of the crime. [Citations_] It amounts to an admission of 
every element of the crime charged. [Citations.] Thus after a plea of 
guilty properly received the prosecution is under no duty to prove that 
. [defendant] committed the crime." (People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 
636, 651 [343 P.2d 577].) After a plea of guilty a defendant may not 
question the admissibility of evidence (In re Seiterle, supra). Such 
consequences do not ensue, however, when a plea of not guilty has been 
entered. Defendant did not waive the right to challenge the confessions 
on Escobedo grounds merely because the conduct of his defense was 
not as vigorous as perhaps it might have been. 
2The judgment on the issue of penalty would have to be reversed even 
if such reversal were not compelled by the reversal of the judgment on 
the issue of guilt. In his argument to the jury the district attorney 
nsserted several times that a primary consideration for the jury was 
the right of society to protection. He contended that "in 1950 and up 
to 1957 defendant was subjected to the rehabilitative processes of the 
~tate prison system, the Department of Corrections, and was he re-
habilitated in 1962' It that is the kind of rehabilitation there is, I think 
the word should have ita meaning changed in the dictionary. [I]f 
the type of rehabilitation they had back in those days was as effective 
as it appeared on this defendant, anything would be better. But how 
much better'" He stated to the jury that if it felt that life imprison-
ment, "carrying with it the availability of rehabilitation, will not 
accomplish its purpose, then . . . the death penalty is the appropriate 
penalty." In discussini opinion evidence introduced by defendant on the 
I ) 
--J 
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At the retrial on the issue of penalty the prosecution intro-
duced police testimony describing statements made by de-
fendant before he was brought to the police station for book-
ing. These statements were no~ oifered at the trial on the 
question of rehabilitation, the district attorney went on to argue: 
"[T]he stakes are too high for possibilities. I don't want to gamble 
like that and· you • . . should likewise not want to gamble. I want 
probabilities •••. 
, 'There ill nothing that can be done with him that hasn't been tried. 
and proved llIIlIuccessfuL If you want to try it again, the gamble ill too 
great. Nobody has come forward and said that defendant probably 
would be rehabilitated • • • the odds are too long. • • . I don't like that 
gamble." 
In Peop"U v. MOf'Be, 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33], 
we disapproved of prosecution attempts to "emphasize to the jury the 
pouibility of error bY' the Adult Authority and the potential grievous 
harm that might result from the inadvertent parole of a defendant 
eonvicted of murder." (ld. at pp. 638-639.) We stated that "The 
function of the jury is to consider the facts surrounding the crime and 
the defendant's background, and upon that basis, reach its decision. The 
jury should not be invited to decide if the defendant will be fit for 
release in the future; it should not at all be involved in the wue of the 
time, if aD7, when the defendant should be released; it should not be 
propelled into weighing the possible consequences of the Authority's 
administrative action." (ld. at p. 643.) 
We also stated in Morse that the jury is "entitled to weigh psychiatric 
find other testimony as to [defendant's] susceptibility to rehabilitation 
D.nd reformation," but we admonished that the jury "should not • • • 
attempt to appraise whether at some future date the Adult Authority 
may improperly release the defendant or speculate as to when he might 
be released." (ld. at p. 641.) Thus, the Morse case distinguishes 
argument directed at the possibility of defendant's rehabilitation, which 
is proper, from argument that emphasizes the possibility of defendant's 
release, which is improper. The concern of the jury is whether or not 
defendant is fit to live, not with whether society is to be "protected" 
from hypothetical erroneous decisions of the parole authorities in the 
future. 
The arguments set out above are strikingly similar to those we dis-
approved on defendant's first appeal (People v. Treloar, 61 Cal.2d 544, 
548 and fa. 2 [59 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 P.2d 698]) as tending" to invite 
[the juryl to impose the death penalty in order to prevent the Adult 
Authority from miatakenly paroling defendant while he remained a 
danger to society." There, as here, the prosecutor stressed the" gamble" 
of rehabilitation, the need to "protect society" and the past failure of 
the authorities to rehabilitate defendant. This time, the prosecutor 
merely avoided using the words "parole" or "Adult Authority." Once 
again, however, he attempted to convince the jury that the Adult 
Authority could not be trusted to protect the interests of society and 
might some day release defendant, even if he were not rehabilitated. The 
references to the" Department of Corrections" and its previous dealings 
with defendant, make it clear that the ., gamble" that the jury was to 
reject was not that defendant might not be rehabilitated, but the 
possibility that "potential grievous harm . . . might result from the 
inadvertent parole of a defendant convicted of murder." The argument 
was not merely a "rhetorical device" as the Attorney General contends, 
but constituted an appeal to the jury to assume the responsibility of the 
Adult Authority and" decide if the defendant will be fit for release in 
the future. . • ." 
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issue of guilt, but they may be offered on a retrial of that 
issue. 
[5a] Defendant was arrested in Los Angeles on March 
27, 1962. As the arresting officer reached to disarm him, 
defendant exclaimed, "You have the right man" and "This 
is the gun I had." These remarks will be referred to as 
defendant's first statement. [6a] In the police car, he 
initiated a conversation with one of the officers. He v.olun-
teered that had the police been a few minutes late in arrest-
ing him he would not have been caught, as he was planning 
to leave for South America. He asked how long Rivard, the 
murder victim, had lived. These remarks will be referred to 
as defendant's second statement. [7a] The officer replied 
and then asked, "What happened to the guy [the victim] in 
Farah's bad" Defendant responded that "he tried to be a 
hero," and, when requested to explain, continued, "the guy' 
wouldn't do . what he was told." These remarks will be 
referred to as the third statement. 
[5b-7b] These three statements are admissible. When 
they were made, three of the four conditions of Escobedo and 
Dorado' necessary to attain the vital accusatory stage had 
been met, but the condition that the statements be the result 
of a "process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting 
incriminating statements" (People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 
571, 577 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97] ; People v. Dorado, 
supt'a, 62 CaL2d at p. 353; Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 
U.S. at p. 491) had not been met. The test whether a pro-
hibited process of interrogations has been undertaken is ob-
jective. "Whatever may be the sqbjective intent of the inter-
rogators, we must. . . analyze the total situation which 
envelops the questioning by considering such factors as the 
length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interro-
gation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police 
and all other relevant circumstances." (People v. Stewart, 
supra, at p. 579.) As we explained in In re Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 
368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380], the United States Su-
preme Court in Escobedo "sought to eliminate conditions 
which invited coerced confessions"; it "sought primarily to 
prevent police tactics which, in the past, have spawned in-
voluntary confessions." (62 Ca1.2d at pp. 372-373.) In 
People v. Cotter, 63 Ca1.2l1 :lS6 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 
862], we pointed out that all analysis of Escobedo, Dorado, 
and Stewart, supra, makes it clear that those cases were pri-
marily aimed at preventing police officers from employing 
"inquisitorial techniques in seeking to prove the charge 
... ) 
/ 
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against the accused out of his own mouth." (63 Cal.2d at 
p. 393.) The facts of the cases deeided by this court that 
compelled reversal under Escobedo. demonstrated that the 
police had attempted a process of' sustained and accusatory 
inquiries, resulting in active, if sometimes subtle, pressure 
upon the accused to incriminate himself. 
[50] It is evident that defendant's first statement, made 
immediately upon his arrest, was entirely spontaneous and in 
no way elicited by the .police. [60] Defendant's second 
statement was also spontaneous. [70] The third statement 
was given in response to an officer's question, but the cir-
cumstances under which the statement was made were unlike 
the "total situation" in the Escobedo case and the cases 
following it in four crucial respects: (1) defendant had been 
in police custody for a few minutes only and was in the 
process of being promptly taken to the police station; (2) the 
questioning was initiated by defendant, and the statement 
was volunteered in response to a neutral inquiry invited by 
defendant's own remarks; (3) the conduct of the police was 
neither intimidating nor accusatory, nor did it appear in any 
way designed to elicit incriminating statements; (4) defend-
ant had virtually confessed in his earlier statements. There 
was thus no inquisitorial pressure, subtle or blunt, asserted 
against defendant and designed "to prove the charge against 
: the accused out of his own mouth." (People v. Ootter, supra, 
at p. 393.) 
Other questions raised are not likely to arise on retrial. 
The remittitur issued in Crim. No. 7352, People v. Treloar, 
61 Cal.2d 544 [39 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 P.2d 698], is recalled 
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of July 14, 1964, 
vacated. The judgment appealed from is reversed in its en-
tirety. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., Concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.,. Dissenting.-Beforewe can tenably 
reach the result decreed by the majority a critic~l question 
appears to be: Do we have multiple causes before us or only a 
single "entire cause" f The issue is critical because it is 
jurisdictional. Only if we view this case as presenting mul-
tiple "causes" to be severally determined, each without bene-
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign. 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
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fit of the record in the other, can we find color of constitu-
tional authority to reverse. 
To begin with it is noted that the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia is a court of limited jurisdiction. The sole source of 
our relevant power is article VI of the state Constitution. 
That article measures the grant and defines its limits as fol-
lows: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
on appeal from the superior courts . . . on questions of law 
alone, in all criminal cases where judgment of death has been 
rendered; ... (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4.) 
"No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in 
any case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the 
improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error 
as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any 
matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the en-
tire cause, inc;luding the evidence, the court shall be of the 
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a mis-
carriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
In my view of the law we have before us only one action. 
The state is plaintiff-respondent; Treloar is the defendant-
appellant. 
We are not triers of fact but, for the limited purpose of 
determining whether a miscarriage of justice is shown, we 
must consider the evidence which the jury heard and the 
ultimate facts which they found, together with the rulings 
which 'the trial court made. In view of the presumption of 
innocence at the trial, the jury must have been instructed to 
that effect, but on appeal after conviction the rule changes. If 
the record shows any substantial evidence to support the 
judgment the presumption is in favor of the jUdgment. (See 
People v. Daugherty (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [5] [256 P.2d 
911], and the authorities there cited, rejecting the contrary 
statements in People v. Lamson (1934) 1 Cal.2d 648, 661 [36 
P.2d 361], and People v. Staples (1906) 149 Cal. 405, 425-426 
[86 P. 886].) 
In People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 289 [10 Cal. 
Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255], a unanimous court reiterated these 
propositions which are fundamental to our appellate review: 
" [4] The credence and ultimate weight to be given the evi-
dence of the various particular circumstances are of course 
for the trier of fact, and 'It is the trier of fact, not the 
appellate court, that must be convinced of a defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [5] If the circumstances 
reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of 
) 
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the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be rea-
sonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a 
reversal of the judgment! (People y. Robillard (1960), ante, 
pp. 88, 93 [1,2) [10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295].) 
"[6] The rule that 'to justify a conviction on circumstan-
tial evidence the facts and circumstances must not only· be 
entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must be in-
consistent with any other rational conchision' (People v. 
Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 46, 49 [3] [286 P.2d I) ; People v: 
Bender (1945) 27 Ca1.2d 164, 174-175 [1, 2] [163 P.2d 8]) is 
primarily for the guidance of the trier of fact. Such rule 
would be applicable to appellate review of a conviction only 
where, giving to each circumstance in evidence all the legal 
effect toward guilt which it could support, it would still 
appear that a rational conclusion of innocence was not ex-
cluded .... " 
In view of the record before us, and of the above deline-
ated constitutional limits of our jurisdiction, I find no ten-
able basis for the majority's holding that "violation of 
Escobedo compels reversal of the judgment on the issue of 
guilt on all counts." As appears from the above quoted man-
date of our Constitution, no judgment on the issue of guilt 
can be lawfully reversed by this court unless it' shall have 
found .. after an e~amination of the entire cause, including 
the evidence . . . that the error complained of has resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice. " 
The mere fact that in a potential death penalty case the 
determination of guilt and penalty are now by statute recog-
nized as presenting in certain circumstances severable issues 
for some purposes (see Pen. Code, § 190.1) does not mean 
that the criminal action proliferates into more than one 
"entire cause." Before the Legislature amended Penal Code 
section 190 and added section 190.1 in 1957 (Stats. 1957, ch. 
1968, p. 3509, §§ 1, 2; see also Stats. 1959, ch. 738,. p. 2727, 
§ 1) this court, in the interests of efficiency and expedition of 
justice, l had itself 'innovated the procedure as an incident in 
the "entire cause." (People v. Green (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 209, 
232-234 [302 P.2d 307].) 
The entire cause is now before us and it is upon the com-
plete record that defendant must seek reversal and that we 
must rest our decision. 
ITo avoid needless delay and aggravation of burden 'upon both an 
aeeused and the state which would dow from reopening the entire cause 
.. to all iuuea because ot error affet'.ting only one. 
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In demanding reversal defendant necessarily presents to US 
that which i$ unfavorable as well as that which may tend to 
support his claim. Mere basic fairness to the People of Cali. 
fornia requires that we consider the plaintiff's claims for_ 
affirmance as sQlicitously as those of defendant for reversal. 
Examination of the record, including the retrial of the 
penalty phase, discloses that no "miscarriage of justice" can 
properly be found if we abide by the constitutional and deci-
sionallaw above quoted. The record shows (and the majority 
state) : "Defendant was arrested . . . on March 27, 1962. As 
the arresting officer reached to disarm him, defendant ex· 
claimed, 'You have the right man' and 'This is the gun I 
had.' . . . In the police car, he initiated a conversation with 
one of the officers. He volunteered that had the police been a 
few minutes late in arresting him he would not have been 
ca.ught, as he was planning to leave for South America. He 
asked how long Rivard, the murder victim, had lived ...• 
The officer replied and then asked, 'What happened to the 
guy [the vi<:tim] in Farah's barf' Defendant responded that 
'he tried to be a hero,' and, when requested to explain, con· 
tinued, 'the guy wouldn't do what he was told.''' The 
majority pr~perly hold "These three statements are admis-
sible." The majority should further hold that these quoted 
statements, in tIle context of independent evidence and the 
related physical facts establishing defendant's guilt of some 
16 felonies including the murder during a robbery, are so 
overwhelming in demonstration of guilt that any question as 
to the voluntary character of further statements made by 
defendant is immaterial. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 491-492 [84 
S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], the majority opinion by Mr. 
Justice Goldberg makes clear that the court did not overmle 
Crooker v. California (1958) 357 U.S. 433 [78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1448]. The opinion points -out that in Crooker the 
court rejected the absolute rule that every state denial of a 
request to contact counsel is an infringement of the constitu- . 
tional right without regard to the circumstances of the case. 
In its place the following rule was announced: "[S]tate 
refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process 
not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the 
merits, [citation], but also if he is deprived of counsel for 
any part of the pretrial procpeuings, provided that he is so 
prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an 
absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very 
I I .-:. ,. __ •••• _ _. _0" __ 
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concept of justice.' Lisenba v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 
219,236 [62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166]. Cf. Moore v. Michigan 
(1957) 355 U.S. 155, 160 [78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed.2d 167]. The 
latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circum-
stances of the case." (Italics added. ) 
This court in recent months has repeatedly followed the 
constitutional avenue of reason left open in Escobedo2 rather 
than a penal theory of automatic reversal which appeared to 
have been a trend in earlier cases in this state. Thus, in the 
late case of People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319 at page 
329 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405P.2d 555], speaking through Mr. 
Justice Mosk, the court clearly stated the issue ("We turn, 
therefore, to the. question whether the introduction of the 
statements obtained in violation of defendant's right to the 
assistance of counsel was reversible error") and at page 
333 concluded by applying our constitutional rule of reason 
(" After an examination of the entire cause, including the 
evidence, we are of the opinion that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the errors complained of might have con-
tributed to the conviction. (Cal. Const.,art. VI, § 4% ; 
People v. Wats01& (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] ; 
Fahy v. Oonnecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 91 [84 S.Ct. 229, 11 
L.Ed.2d 171].)") 
Likewise in People v. Cotter (1965) 63 Qa1.2d 386, 396 
[46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862], Mr. Justic~ Burke for the 
court wrote: "It is nl;)teworthy that in Escobedo, Dorado and 
Stewart[a} the defendants were denying complicity and the 
police were openly accusing them and urging them to tell the 
truth. By contrast, here the defendant was merely asked to 
state what had happened. He was not being accused of a crime 
which he had previously denied committing, which was the 
case in Escobedo, Dorado and Stewart, but in fact was asked 
concerning a crime which he had already freely admitted 
having committed. 
"Neither this court, nor the United States Supreme Court, 
has ever taken the position that the desire of a guilty man to 
confess his crime should be stifled, impeded, discouraged, or 
hindered in any way. The contrary is true. ,. 
" 
2Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) wpra, 378 U.S. 478. 
aEscobedo v. Illinois (1964) wpra, 378 U.S. 478, PeOfJltl v. Dorado 
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]; People v. 
Stewart (1965) 62 CaL2d 571 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]. 
... -:::~ 
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"[P. 397-398] Escobedo, Dorado and Stewarl4 are also 
to be distinguished from the case at bench in that in none of 
them was the court confronted with the problem here pre-
sented of determining the legal effect of receiving in evidence 
a series of confessions and statements, some of which were 
made during the investigatory phase· and were properly 
received and others of which were given during the accusa-
tory stage and were improperly considered. 
"Such a problem was before the court in the recent case of 
People v. Jacobson, ante, [63 Cal.2d] p.319 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, . 
405 P.2d 555]. There, the improperly obtained statements were 
held to be merely cumulative, and since they occurred last in 
sequence it was held that they could not give rise to an impli-
cation that the legally obtained confessions were 'induced' 
by any subsequently improperly obtained. (People v. Jacob-
son, supra, at pp. 330-331.) Under such circumstances this 
court held. that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
illegally obtained confessions contributed to the conviction. 
(See also Pahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 91 [84 
S.Ot. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171].) 
"Similarly, applying the test prescribed in People v. Wat-
son, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 835 [299 P.2d 243], we find that there is 
no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the 
defendant would have been reached here had the illegally 
admitted confessions not been received in evidence. ~Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 4%.}" See also People v. MitcheU (1966) 
63 Ca1.2d 805 [48 Cal Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211], wherein 
Mr. Justice McComb for a unanimous court, review~ the 
defendant's several claims of error, and applied the cited 
rule of article VI, section 4%. 
When this ease was first before us we considered the evi-
dence on the issue of guilt and held (People v. Treloar 
(1964) 61 Ca1.2d 544, 546 [39 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 P.2d 698]) : 
"Treloar does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's determination of guilt nor does he other-
wise question that phase of the case. It is likewise our conclu-
sion, based upon our independent search of the record (see 
People v. Illes, 17 Cal.2d 459, 462 [110 P.2d 408]), that the 
issue of guilt was properly determined by the jury." 
Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record now before us 
which would support a conclusion on the guilt phase con-
'Escobedo v. nu,.m. (1964) suprIJ, 318 U.s. 418; Peop'- v. Dorado 
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trary to that which we formally declared when we filed the 
cited decision on July 14, 1964. Furthermore, the additional 
record now here makes still more certain the guilt of this 
defendant and the implicit integrity and justice of the 
jury's verdict as to penalty. . 
Complying with the duty imposed upon us by the same 
Constitution which grants our power, I have examined "the 
entire cause, including the evidence" and I am not "of the 
opinion that [any] error complaiJied of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. " 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 9, 
1966. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. McComb, J., 
Burke, J., and Schauer, J.,. were of the opinion that the peti-
tion should be granted. 
